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Abstract
Composition of capital varies systematically with incomes: rich countries have
higher equipment capital shares than poor countries. Also, equipment production is
highly concentrated and most countries import equipment. I investigate the quantita-
tive importance of equipment trade for capital composition and how it affects incomes
through capital composition. In a multi-country trade model, I show that equipment
trade accounts for one-quarter of the cross-country variation in equipment capital share.
The decline in equipment trade barriers during 1985-2005 resulted in income gains for
all countries. Digging into these income gains reveals that capital composition is an
important transmission mechanism: changes in capital composition alone account for
45 percent of the gains.
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1 Introduction
Income differences across countries are enormous. One of the most robust relationships
in economic growth literature is that physical capital intensity is systematically related to
income across countries. The capital-output ratio in rich countries is over three times the
capital-output ratio in poor countries. This has led economists to examine the determinants
of physical capital intensity and the resulting implications for cross-country incomes. The
broad consensus is that low productivity levels in poor countries, either due to production
inefficiency or misallocation of factors, are mainly responsible for low capital-output ratios
and, thus, low incomes (see, for instance, Restuccia and Urrutia, 2001; Hsieh and Klenow,
2007; Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang, 2013). In this paper, I offer a new understanding of
physical capital intensity and incomes by focussing on the composition of physical capital.
Rich countries have higher equipment capital intensity than poor countries. Twenty-
one percent of the capital stock in rich is in equipment, and the remainder is in structures
or buildings.1 Equipment capital share in poor is only seven percent (for rich versus poor
comparisons, I use 90th and 10th percentiles of the world income per worker distribution
to represent rich and poor, respectively). While the equipment capital-output ratio in rich
is six times the equipment capital-output ratio in poor, the 90th to 10th percentile ratio
for structures capital-output ratio is only 1.7 (see Mutreja, 2014, for details).2 Thus, cross-
country differences in the equipment capital-output ratio are larger than those of structures.
Another stylized fact is that the world equipment production is highly concentrated, and
most countries import their equipment (see Eaton and Kortum, 2001). In my sample, 78.3
percent of the world equipment is produced in seven countries, and the correlation between
equipment import share and income per worker is -0.19.3
In this paper, I bring above facts together and investigate the role of equipment trade
in determining cross-country composition of capital. Quantitatively, I find that equipment
trade plays a key role in determining capital composition. Overall, equipment trade accounts
for 23 percent of the cross-country variation in the equipment capital share. This is the
first contribution of this paper. Rich reap efficiency gains from trade by specializing in
equipment, and poor benefit by trading their comparative advantage good for equipment,
1Equipment comprise fabricated metal products, electrical and non-electrical machinery, transport equip-
ment, communication equipment, office machinery, and professional and scientific equipment. Structures
include residential and non-residential buildings.
2The data used in this paper are for a sample of 65 countries in 2005. Mutreja (2014) presents facts on
capital composition for a larger sample of 119 countries.
3Equipment import share is computed as Imports
Production−Exports+Imports
.
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which is inefficiently produced at home. In the absence of equipment trade, all countries
have much smaller equipment capital stocks, and their equipment capital shares reduce to
about one-half. Second, I study the implications for incomes. Capital composition is a
quantitatively significant channel through which equipment trade affects incomes. Income
gains from the fall in equipment trade barriers during 1985-2005 are large, and changes in
capital composition account for 35 percent of the income gain in rich and 64 percent in
poor. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that studies the role of equipment
trade in cross-country composition of capital and how trade affects incomes through capital
composition.
One might argue that the level of capital stock, as compared to its composition is more
important for determining income. An examination of the data reveals that while the cross-
country gap in levels of aggregate capital-output ratio exhibits little change over time, signifi-
cant changes have taken place in the composition of capital across countries. The equipment
capital share has increased in rich countries, but it has declined in many poor countries.
The implications for income have also evolved: in a standard income accounting exercise,
the importance of capital composition for income has more than quadrupled overtime. Most
models of economic growth focus on the aggregate capital-output ratios and inevitably ignore
the changes in composition that have taken place over time. These changes are important
because they potentially reflect the extent of investment-specific technological change that
has taken place across countries. Textbooks on economic growth and development character-
ize the process of economic growth by rapid capital accumulation. One key feature of rapid
capital accumulation has been the substantial rise of equipment capital intensity. Trade
speeds up this process. Countries that gain the most from equipment trade do so not only
because they accumulate more capital but also because they accumulate equipment capital
at a faster rate than structures.
I begin by extending the multi-country Ricardian trade model in Eaton and Kortum
(2002) and incorporate four sectors: equipment goods (tradable investment goods), struc-
tures (non-traded investment goods), tradable intermediate goods, and a non-traded final
good. Countries differ in their average level of productivity for each of the tradable goods
and in their final good productivity. International trade is subject to bilateral iceberg costs.
A representative household consumes the final good and allocates its savings to investment in
equipment goods and investment structures. The stocks of equipment and structures capital,
as well as the equipment capital share, are determined endogenously in the world general
equilibrium and are functions of a country’s productivity levels, and home expenditure shares
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(fraction of expenditure on goods produced at home).
To quantify the multi-country model, I calibrate productivity levels and trade costs to
the data on relative prices and bilateral trade flows in my sample. The quantitative model
fits calibration targets well and is consistent with observed cross-country differences in equip-
ment capital share, equipment and structures capital stocks and cross-country incomes. The
model also matches cross-country variation in several other variables that are not specifically
targeted in the calibration, for instance, the world pattern of equipment production.
The calibrated productivity levels imply that rich countries are highly productive in
equipment. Rich have a comparative advantage in equipment, while poor have a comparative
advantage in intermediate goods. The average equipment productivity in rich is 3.54 times
that in poor. Similar to Waugh (2010), poor countries face higher trade costs than rich
countries to export to all destinations. The correlation between average equipment trade
cost and income per worker is -0.37.
In the structural framework, the equipment capital share in a country is a function
of its average productivity in equipment, average productivity in intermediate goods, and
trade flows. A variance decomposition exercise implies that equipment trade accounts for 23
percent of the cross-country dispersion in equipment’s share. This is non-trivial. Equipment
productivity differences account for 50 percent, and remaining variation in the equipment
capital share is accounted for by intermediate goods productivity and trade flows.
To explore and quantify the mechanisms through which equipment trade affects capital
composition and incomes, I conduct several counterfactual experiments by adjusting equip-
ment trade costs. In one of the experiments, I assess the role of decline in equipment trade
costs between 1985 and 2005 in the evolution of equipment capital shares and incomes across
countries. For this, I calibrate equipment trade costs for 1985 and find that between 1985 and
2005, equipment trade costs declined by 71 percent, on average, with rich exporters experi-
encing a slightly larger decline. The results from the experiment imply that the 1985-2005
fall in equipment trade costs increased equipment capital share by 10 percent in rich and
3 percent in poor. Incomes also respond to the decline in trade costs: on average, incomes
rose by 8.4 percent.
What is the source of these income gains? Income in my model is determined by a coun-
try’s total factor productivity (henceforth, TFP), equipment and structures capital stocks,
and a term that captures the effect of composition of capital. I find that capital composition
is a significant channel through income gains from reduced equipment trade costs are trans-
mitted. Between 1985 and 2005, the proportion of income gain stemming from the changes
4
in capital composition is 35 percent in rich and 64 percent in poor. The remainder is due
to the changes in TFP and capital stock (the TFP is partially endogenous and depends on
the trade flows). In no way, these magnitudes are small. Moreover, the capital composition
channel is quantitatively more important for poor countries.
The mechanics of the above gains lie in how effective equipment productivity responds
to adjustments in equipment trade costs. The equipment sector has a continuum of goods.
Relative to no-equipment trade, trade enables rich countries to specialize in production of
those equipment goods along the continuum for which they have the highest idiosyncratic
productivity draws and import the remainder. Reductions in trade costs lead to further
specialization in equipment and a subset of the continuum is produced at home. Intuitively,
effective equipment productivity captures a country’s average productivity over this subset
of the continuum. Poor countries also experience an increase in their effective equipment
productivity as they reduce the production of equipment goods with low idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity draws. The 1985-2005 fall in equipment trade costs led to specialization according
to comparative advantage in all countries. As a result, the effective equipment productivity
increased by a factor of 1.7 in rich and 1.5 in poor, translating into large increases in equip-
ment capital share and income. Reductions in barriers to equipment trade allocate world
resources towards more efficient outcomes and increase effective equipment productivity in
all countries. These gains in effective productivity have significant implications for capital
composition and incomes.
The literature on composition of capital is relatively small. Mutreja (2014) measures
the effect of capital composition on cross-country incomes, but does not investigate the
determinants of capital composition. While the existing literature has mainly focussed on
investment composition and its determinants, this is the first paper to quantify the role of
trade in capital composition. Caselli and Wilson (2004) study nine capital goods categories
and explain investment composition based on efficiency and abundance of complementary
factors inputs. Although they use imports in each category of capital as a proxy for the overall
investment in that type of capital, they find no role for trade in investment composition.
Bems (2008) presents facts on investment in tradable and non-tradable goods but does not
shed light on the determinants of disaggregate investment levels.
The importance of equipment capital for economic growth is well known. Technologi-
cal improvements are often embodied in improved equipment (see, for instance, Greenwood,
Hercowitz, and Krusell, 1997), tend to be skill-biased and so, exhibit capital-skill complemen-
tarity (see, for instance, Krusell et al., 2000). Also, a growing body of research quantifies
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the role of equipment trade in economic growth and related outcomes. Eaton and Kor-
tum (2001) and Mutreja, Ravikumar, and Sposi (2016) study the implications of equipment
trade for incomes. Burstein, Cravino, and Vogel (2013), Parro (2013) and Raveh and Reshef
(2016) assess the role of equipment trade in cross-country skill premium. The more recent
quantitative models connect endogenous capital formation with equipment trade flows. A
common finding of existing empirical and quantitative research on trade and incomes is that
reductions in trade costs lead to large gains in economic well-being. My results reaffirm
the significance of equipment capital and equipment trade for economic growth. However,
this is not the purpose of my paper. My focus is on composition of capital, how equipment
trade affects it, and the resulting implications for incomes. While I also find large income
gains from reductions in trade costs, I dig into the black box of the source of these gains
and quantify a new mechanism (namely, capital composition) through which countries reap
these gains.
This paper relates to the section of economic growth literature that studies the role of
trade in capital formation and income across countries. Eaton and Kortum (2001) employ
a structural model of bilateral trade in equipment, and find that equipment trade barriers
explain approximately 12.5 percent of the income differences. Capital is not endogenous in
their model. I focus on capital composition and construct a multi-country general equilib-
rium model with both equipment and non-equipment (intermediate goods) trade. Capital
stocks and capital composition are endogenous in my model. I find that during 1985-2005
approximately 45 percent of income gains from a removal of equipment trade costs are trans-
mitted through the capital composition mechanism.
My paper is related to parallel research in Mutreja, Ravikumar, and Sposi (2016). Rel-
ative to Mutreja, Ravikumar, and Sposi (2016), the main distinctions are the question and
the quantitative results. While both the papers highlight the role of equipment trade for
capital formation across countries, I separate the the effect of composition of capital from
its level. Mutreja, Ravikumar, and Sposi (2016) analytically argue that a large fraction of
the income gains from trade are because of changes in capital stock. Using recent data on
capital composition (from Mutreja, 2014), I measure the relative importance of level versus
composition of capital for the transmission of gains from trade during 1985-2005. Addition-
ally, my results show that capital composition is a quantitatively more important mechanism
for poor countries for the transmission of the income gains.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents motivating facts and addresses the level
versus composition issue. Section 3 presents the multi-country trade model. In section 4, I
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present the quantification procedure, and in section 5, I present results from the quantitative
model. Section 6 presents counterfactual experiments and measures the role of trade in
capital composition and incomes. Section 7 concludes.
2 Motivating facts
Why should we focus on composition of capital? In this section, I present facts on capital
composition and conduct exercises to motivate the significance of capital composition, in
particular how this significance has evolved over time. The data on capital stocks and its
composition correspond to 119 countries (see Mutreja, 2014).
The top panel in figure 1 plots aggregate capital-output ratios over time for the world, the
90th percentile country (representative rich) and the 10th percentile country (representative
poor).4 The capital-output ratios are plotted relative to their levels in 1960. The facts
presented in this figure are already well known. Over the 45 year time period, the aggregate
capital-output ratios show little upward movement and are essentially flat. Also, the gap in
capital-output ratios between rich and poor has been persistent: the 90th to 10th percentile
ratio falls in the range 3-4, though this gap has slightly widened overtime.
The picture looks different when we decompose aggregate capital stock into equipment
and structures. The middle panel of figure 1 plots the evolution of aggregate, equipment
and structures capital-output ratios for the world, all relative to their respective levels in
1960. The world stock of equipment capital has grown tremendously over the years. The
equipment capital-output ratio in the world has increased by more than a factor of two,
while the structures capital-output ratio has declined, albeit modestly.
Is the rise of equipment capital distributed equally across countries? The answer is no.
Many poor countries experience a decline instead of an increase in their equipment capital
shares. The bottom panel of the figure 1 plots the equipment capital share in the world,
the representative rich country and the representative poor country. Over this time period,
the equipment capital share increases by 84 percent in the rich country and it declines by
36 percent in the poor country. A majority of rich and poor countries exhibit this pattern.
For instance, during this time period the equipment capital share more than triples in the
US and it nearly doubles in Luxembourg. In Niger, equipment capital share declines by 65
percent and in Gambia, it declines by 44 percent. Countries growing at high rates experience
episodes of steep rise in their equipment capital shares. Between 1960 and 1990, Korea’s
4”World” comprises of 119 countries from Mutreja (2014).
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structural transformation coincided with a growth of equipment capital share by 264 percent
and since 1980, China’s manufacturing growth has been accompanied by a near doubling of
its equipment capital share.
Thus, while cross-country gap in the level of aggregate capital-output ratio is stable over
the years, the composition of capital has changed substantially. Are these changes in com-
position important for incomes across countries? Here, I motivate the importance of capital
composition through a standard income accounting exercise (see Caselli, 2005), though this
question is answered much more rigorously in the remainder of the paper. Assuming a Cobb-
Douglas production function with equipment capital, structures capital and human capital
augmented labor as factors, the income per worker in country i is given by
yi = Aik
µα
ei k
(1−µ)α
si h
α
i
where Ai represents country i’s TFP, kei and ksi are equipment and structures capital per
worker and hi denotes the average human capital per worker. α and µ are the factor shares.
Using α = 1/3 and µ = 0.56 from Mutreja (2014), equipment and structures capital per
worker account for 22.5 percent of the log variance in income per worker. The remaining
77.5 percent of the log variance is due to differences in residual TFP and hi.
Defining equipment capital share in country i as zi =
kei
kei+ksi
, the income per worker is:
yi = Ai (kei + ksi)
α {zµi (1− zi)
1−µ}α hαi .
The contribution of capital to incomes is given by the expression (kei+ksi)
α {zµi (1−zi)
1−µ}α.
Of this, while the first term captures the contribution of the level of capital stock, the sec-
ond term captures the effect of its composition. Consider the following numerical exercise.
Suppose each country’s total capital stock per worker, kei + ksi, is kept fixed and the equip-
ment capital share, zi, is adjusted to that in the US. This eliminates capital composition
differences across countries while the differences in the level of capital stock remain. In the
income accounting, this reduces the contribution of capital by 25 percent. Thus, composi-
tion differences are responsible for one-fourth of the overall contribution of capital in income
accounting. Has the importance of capital composition evolved over time? Yes. If the same
numerical exercise is conducted for prior years, the role of composition is smaller the further
back we go. For instance in 1990 capital composition accounts for only 14 percent of the
overall contribution of capital in income accounting and in 1980 it is much smaller at six
percent. Clearly, differences in composition of capital matter, much more now than they
used to 30 or so years ago.
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Figure 1: Capital and its composition
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In an online appendix to this paper, I show that a neoclassical growth model along
the lines of Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) and Hsieh and Klenow (2007) is consistent with
observed capital-output ratios but it fails to produce the observed differences in capital com-
position.5 Most models of economic growth focus on aggregate capital-output ratios and
inevitably ignore the changes in composition that have taken place over time. These changes
are important because they potentially reflect the extent of investment-specific technolog-
ical change that has taken place across countries. Additionally, equipment is the tradable
component of capital. Over the years, capital composition has potentially emerged as a sig-
nificant channel through which equipment trade affects incomes. Accordingly, in this paper,
I study the role of equipment trade in determining capital composition and assess resulting
implications for incomes.
3 Multi-Country Trade Model
The world economy consists of N countries. Each country has four sectors: equipment,
investment structures, intermediate goods, and final good. Broadly, equipment correspond
to producer durables, and investment structures correspond to residential and non-residential
buildings (see also Mutreja, Ravikumar, and Sposi, 2016). Equipment and intermediate
goods are tradable, while structures and final good are non-traded. Within each country i,
there is a measure of consumers, Li, that grows at the rate n. Each consumer has one unit
of time, which is supplied inelastically in the domestic labor market. Stocks of equipment
capital, structures capital, and labor are used to produce the flow of equipment, structures,
intermediate goods, and final good. Factors are mobile across sectors, and labor is immobile
across countries. In what follows, all variables for country i are normalized relative to the
labor force in country i and denote per worker quantities. The country and time subscripts
are omitted where they are understood.
3.1 Production Technology
3.1.1 Tradable Equipment Goods
Equipment goods sector has a continuum of goods that are indexed by e ∈ [0, 1], and are
produced via the following nested Cobb-Douglas production function between equipment
capital ke, structures capital ks, labor l, and the aggregate intermediate good Qm (described
5The online appendix is available at the author’s webpage.
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along with the production technology for intermediate goods):
qe(e) = ze(e)
−θ[(ke
µks
1−µ)
α
l1−α]γeQm
1−γe ,
where, similar to Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977), the production technology
across individual goods differs only in the idiosyncratic productivity level, i.e., ze(e)
−θ. α, µ,
and γe are the factor shares that are common across countries. Goods along the continuum
are aggregated with a Dixit-Stiglitz technology with elasticity of substitution η > 0:
Qe =
[∫ 1
0
qe(e)
η−1
η de
] η
η−1
Productivity distribution: Following Alvarez and Lucas (2007), I assume that ze are
distributed independently and exponentially with parameter λe that differs across countries.
Under this distributional assumption, the idiosyncratic productivity levels, z−θe , follow a
Fre´chet distribution, as used by Eaton and Kortum (2002). Parameter θ controls the dis-
persion of productivity levels around the mean. A larger θ implies more variation relative to
the mean. I assume that θ is common to all countries.
The mean of the productivity distribution is proportional to λθe. λe governs the absolute
advantage of country i in equipment. A country with a higher λθe, on average, can produce
equipment more efficiently.
3.1.2 Non-traded Investment Structures
Each country has a structures sector, in which a representative firm produces homogeneous
structures or buildings that are non-tradable across countries. Factors of production are
combined via the following nested Cobb-Douglas production technology:
Qs = [(ke
µks
1−µ)αl1−α]γsQm
1−γs ,
where γs is the share of value added and is identical across countries.
3.1.3 Tradable Intermediate goods
The production technology for intermediate goods is similar to that for equipment goods.
There are a continuum of goods indexed by m ∈ [0, 1]. Each individual good is produced
via:
qm(m) = zm(m)
−θ[(ke
µks
1−µ)
α
l1−α]γmQm
1−γm ,
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where zm(m)
−θ is the idiosyncratic productivity level. γm is the factor share, which is
the same across countries. The aggregate intermediate good is a C.E.S. aggregate of the
individual goods with a constant elasticity of substitution η > 0:
Qm =
[∫ 1
0
qm(m)
η−1
η dm
] η
η−1
Productivity distribution: Similar to the equipment sector, zm are distributed indepen-
dently and exponentially with parameter λm that varies across countries. λm governs the
absolute advantage of country i in intermediate goods. Comparative advantage is deter-
mined by relative average productivity across the two tradable sectors. A country with
higher (λe/λm)
θ will have comparative advantage in the equipment sector relative to the
intermediate goods sector. I assume that θ is identical across the two tradable sectors.6
3.1.4 Non-traded Final Good
In each country, there is a representative firm that employs factors and produces a non-
tradable homogenous final good with the following production technology:
Qc = Ac[(ke
µks
1−µ)αl1−α]γcQm
1−γc ,
where γc is the factor share, which is common to all countries. Ac is country i’s productivity
in the final good.
3.2 Representative Household
Each country has a representative household that owns the labor endowment, as well as
the stocks of both equipment and structures capital. In time period t, the representative
household starts with ke stock of equipment and ks stock of structures and derives utility
from consuming the final good:
∞∑
t=0
βt
c1−σit
1− σ
,
where cit is the consumption level of the final good in country i at time t. β is the period
discount factor, which satisfies 1
β
> 1+n, and σ is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution.
6Mutreja, Ravikumar, and Sposi (2016) estimate θ separately for capital goods and non-capital goods.
The capital goods in Mutreja, Ravikumar, and Sposi (2016) are analogous to equipment in this paper. They
find that θ is not significantly different across the two sectors.
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Investment in time period t augments the existing capital stocks. Given prices, the
representative household maximizes discounted lifetime utility subject to a budget constraint
and two capital accumulation equations at time t = 0, 1, ...,∞:
Pcitcit + Peitxeit + Psitxsit = wit + reitkeit + rsitksit
(1 + n)keit+1 = (1− δe)keit + xeit
(1 + n)ksit+1 = (1− δs)ksit + xsit,
where δe and δs are the depreciation rates of equipment and structures, respectively. Pc, Pe,
and Ps denote the prices of the final good, equipment, and structures, respectively. w is the
wage rate, and re and rs are the rental rates for equipment and structures, respectively. xeit
and xsit denote investments in the two types of capital in country i in period t.
3.3 International Trade
Both equipment trade and intermediate goods trade are subject to iceberg trade costs,
denoted by τeij and τmij , respectively. More than one unit of an equipment good must be
shipped from country j for one unit to arrive in country i. That is, τeij − 1 units are lost
in the transit. Likewise, for τmij . τeij and τmij comprise both policy and non-policy barriers
to trade. τeij also represents the adjustment costs, if any, associated with adaptation of
imported equipment to domestic production conditions. For consistency, τeii = 1 and τmii = 1
for each country i.
3.4 Equilibrium
The competitive world general equilibrium is a set of prices, allocations, and trade shares
such that, in each country i, the representative household maximizes utility, firms in four
sectors minimize their costs, all goods and factors markets clear, and trade is balanced.
Country i purchases each tradable good from the least-cost supplier. The fraction of
country i’s expenditure in each tradable sector that is spent on goods produced in country
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j is given by the following:
pieij =
[(
rαµej r
α(1−µ)
sj w
1−α
j
)γe
P 1−γemj τeij
]−1/θ
λej∑
l
[(
rαµel r
α(1−µ)
sl w
1−α
l
)γe
P 1−γeml τeil
]−1/θ
λel
pimij =
[(
rαµej r
α(1−µ)
sj w
1−α
j
)γm
P 1−γmmj τmij
]−1/θ
λmj∑
l
[(
rαµel r
α(1−µ)
sl w
1−α
l
)γm
P 1−γmml τmil
]−1/θ
λml
, (1)
where pieij and pimij denote the bilateral trade shares. The price indices of aggregate equip-
ment, Qe, and aggregate intermediate good, Qm, are:
Pei = UVe
[∑
l
{(
rαµel r
α(1−µ)
sl w
1−α
l
)γe
P 1−γeml τeil
}−1/θ
λel
]−θ
Pmi = UVm
[∑
l
{(
rαµel r
α(1−µ)
sl w
1−α
l
)γm
P 1−γmml τmil
}−1/θ
λml
]−θ
,
where Ve, Vm, and U are a collection of constants across countries. These are given by
Ve = (αµγe)
−αµγe(α(1−µ)γe)
α(µ−1)γe((1−α)γe)
(α−1)γe(1−γe)
γe−1, Vm = (αµγm)
−αµγm(α(1−
µ)γm)
α(µ−1)γm((1−α)γm)
(α−1)γm(1− γm)
γm−1, and U = Γ(1+ θ(1− η))
1
1−η , where Γ(·) is the
gamma function (see appendix A for details). As in Eaton and Kortum (2002), I restrict
parameters such that U > 0.
The prices of structures and final good are:
Psi = Vs
(
rαµei r
α(1−µ)
si w
1−α
i
)γs
P 1−γsmi
Pci =
Vc
Ac
(
rαµei r
α(1−µ)
si w
1−α
i
)γc
P 1−γcmi ,
where Vs = (αµγs)
−αµγs(α(1−µ)γs)
α(µ−1)γs((1−α)γs)
(α−1)γs(1−γs)
γs−1 and Vc = (αµγc)
−αµγc(α(1−
µ)γc)
α(µ−1)γc((1− α)γc)
(α−1)γc(1− γc)
γc−1.
The two Euler equations from household optimization lead to the following equilibrium
equipment and structures rental rates:
rei =
[
1
β
− (1− δe)
]
Pei
rsi =
[
1
β
− (1− δs)
]
Psi.
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The optimal solution is characterized by trade balance:
LiPeiQei
∑
j 6=i
pieij + LiPmiQmi
∑
j 6=i
pimij =
∑
j 6=i
LjPejQejpieji +
∑
j 6=i
LjPmjQmjpimji.
The left-hand side denotes country i’s imports of equipment and intermediate goods, while
the right-hand side denotes country i’s exports. This condition allows for trade imbalances
at the sectoral level within each country: a country that is a net exporter of equipment will
necessarily be a net importer of intermediate goods, and vice versa. The equipment and
structures investment levels are given by:
xei = [(1 + n)− (1− δe)]kei
xsi = [(1 + n)− (1− δs)]ksi.
Composition of capital: A feature of the equilibrium is that the stocks of equipment and
structures capital are endogenous. The equipment capital-output ratio and the structures
capital-output ratio in equilibrium are (see appendix A for the derivations):
kei
yi
=
αµ
[ 1
β
− (1− δe)]We
1
Ac
(
λe
pieii
)θ (
λm
pimii
) θ(γc−γe)
γm
ksi
yi
=
α(1− µ)
[ 1
β
− (1− δs)]Ws
1
Ac
(
λm
pimii
) θ(γc−γs)
γm
, (2)
where We =
UVe
Vc
(UVm)
(γc−γe)
γm and Ws =
Vs
Vc
(UVm)
(γc−γs)
γm are a collection of constants. piejj =
1−
∑
v piejv is the fraction of expenditure on equipment goods that is spent on home produced
equipment (henceforth, home expenditure share). Likewise, pimjj = 1−
∑
v pimjv. The share
of equipment in capital is given by:
kei
kei + ksi
=
1
1 + 1−µ
µ
1
β
−(1−δe)
1
β
−(1−δs)
We
Ws
(
λmi
pimii
) θ(γe−γs)
γm
(
λei
pieii
)−θ , (3)
Thus, the capital-output ratios and the equipment capital share are functions of a coun-
try’s productivity levels, as well as home expenditure shares in equipment and intermediate
goods. Since pieii ≤ 1 and pimii ≤ 1, relative to autarky, a world economy with trade is associ-
ated with a higher share of equipment in capital in all countries.
(
λei
pieii
)θ
can be interpreted as
country i’s effective productivity in the equipment sector. Recall that the equipment sector
has a continuum of goods along the unit interval. Within the equipment sector, a country
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experiences efficiency gains by producing at home only a fraction of the continuum for which
it has the high productivity draws (pieii) and by importing goods along the rest of the unit
interval (1-pieii). Reductions in equipment trade costs lead to further specialization along
the unit interval and increase effective equipment productivity by lowering the home expen-
diture share in equipment. Likewise, higher effective productivity in intermediate goods,(
λmi
pimii
)θ
, increases capital composition if γe < γs. The productivity in intermediate goods
affects equipment capital share through the price of equipment and structures. An increase
in the effective productivity of intermediate goods reduces its price. These are inputs into
production of equipment and structures, so prices of both equipment and structures decline;
the price of equipment declines by more if γe < γs, thereby increasing the desirability of
equipment as an investment option.
Equipment can either be produced at home or imported. Productivity levels and trade
costs govern which of these two is more relevant for a certain country. Absolute advantage
determines the size of the equipment sector at home. A country with high productivity
in equipment, λθei, will tend to produce the bulk of equipment at home and, so, will have
a large fraction of its capital in equipment. If equipment cannot be efficiently produced at
home, comparative advantage and trade costs determine the quantity of imported equipment.
Country i will tend to be a net exporter of intermediate goods (because of a comparative
advantage in intermediate goods) if λmi
λei
>
λmj
λej
for some j, even if it has an absolute disad-
vantage in intermediate goods. For such a country, the export barriers control the export
receipts from intermediate goods. This, along with country i’s equipment import barriers,
in turn, pin down the volume of i’s equipment imports. Thus, the world pattern of absolute
and comparative advantage, as well as trade costs, determine capital composition.
Income per worker: The real income per worker in this paper is defined as the per period
earning of the representative household deflated by the price of final good:
yi =
wi
Pci
+
rei
Pci
+
rsi
Pci
Using equilibrium expressions for prices and trade shares, this implies that income per worker
in country i is (see appendix A for the derivation):
yi = ΛAci
(
λm
pimii
) θ(1−γc)
γm (
kµeik
1−µ
si
)α
,
where Λ is a collection of constants. Equivalently, in terms of the equipment capital share
in country i, denoted by zi =
kei
kei+ksi
:
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yi = ΛAci
(
λm
pimii
) θ(1−γc)
γm
(kei + ksi)
α {zµi (1− zi)
1−µ}α. (4)
Income per worker in country i is a function of three things: (i) TFP, Aci
(
λm
pimii
) θ(1−γc)
γm
,
(ii) equipment and structures capital per worker, (kei+ ksi)
α, and (iii) a capital composition
term, {zµi (1− zi)
(1−µ)}α. Trade affects incomes through each of these, and equipment trade
affects incomes through equipment capital per worker and the capital composition term. This
paper focusses on the latter: capital composition. In what follows, I use this expression to
quantify how equipment trade affects incomes through its impact on the capital composition
term. Note that country i’s income is positively related to its equipment capital share (zi)
if zi < µ. An easing of trade restrictions results in higher equipment capital shares and,
therefore, higher incomes in all countries (if zi < µ is satisfied).
To summarize, in the multi-country trade model (henceforth, model), countries differ in
their labor endowment, Li, final good productivity, Aci, average equipment productivity, λ
θ
ei,
average intermediate goods productivity, λθmi, and bilateral trade costs for equipment and
intermediate goods, τeij and τmij . The capital stocks and the composition of capital are
endogenous in the equilibrium, and trade affects incomes through the capital composition
term. In the next section, I present the calibration procedure for common and country-
specific parameters and discuss the fit of the quantitative model.
4 Calibration
I calibrate country-specific parameters by using data on a sample of 65 countries in 2005. This
sample includes both rich and poor countries and accounts for 78 percent of the world GDP.7
Appendix B contains the details on data sources and the procedure for the construction of
the data (see table C.1 in appendix C for the list of countries).
To be consistent with the data on equipment and structures capital stocks employed
in this paper, I map the equipment sector from the model to categories 381-385 of the
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) Revision 2 (see Mutreja, 2014, for
details). These categories correspond to ”Machinery and Equipment” in the World Bank’s
International Comparison Program (ICP). Structures correspond to residential and non-
residential buildings. I, thus, map investment structures into the ”Construction” category
of ICP. The intermediate goods sector corresponds to traded manufactured goods other
7World GDP is computed from the Penn World Tables version 6.3 (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2009).
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than the equipment. The final good sector corresponds to all non-traded goods other than
investment structures.
Common Parameters: Calibrated values for parameters common to all countries are in
table 1.
Table 1: Parameters common across countries
Parameter Description Value
α factor share of capital 1/3
µ factor share of equipment in capital 0.56
δe equipment depreciation rate 0.14
δs structures depreciation rate 0.02
γe share of value added in equipment 0.31
γm share of value added in intermediate goods 0.29
γs share of value added in structures 0.39
γc share of value added in final good 0.75
θ dispersion parameter 0.25
β discount factor 0.96
σ inter-temporal elasticity of substitution 1.5
η elasticity of substitution in CES aggregator 2
Some of the common parameters are calibrated to be consistent with the economic growth
and international trade literature. Using information on self-employed and salaried individ-
uals for a wide cross-section of countries, Gollin (2002) finds that the factor share of labor
is 2/3. This corresponds to 1− α, and, so, I set the factor share of capital at 1/3. I set the
factor share of equipment in capital, µ, at 0.56, in accordance with Greenwood, Hercowitz,
and Krusell (1997).8 They calibrate a model of investment-specific technological change to
data on the US economy, and their estimates imply an equipment factor share of 0.56. The
data on equipment and structures capital stocks employed in this paper are constructed
using a 14 percent equipment depreciation rate and a 2 percent structures depreciation rate
(see Mutreja, 2014, for details). I, thus, set δe = 0.14 and δs = 0.02. θ controls the dispersion
in productivity levels. I use θ equal to 0.25, as in Simonovska and Waugh (2014).9
8In the literature, values for the factor share of equipment capital range between 0.54-0.65 (see Mutreja,
2014, for details). I used µ=0.5 and µ=0.6 to determine the sensitivity of results to this factor share
parameter. The implications are qualitatively similar to the ones in the baseline specification.
9Simonovska and Waugh (2014) estimate a θ = 0.25 for all tradable goods combined into one category.
Conceivably, θ is different for equipment and intermediate goods. Mutreja, Ravikumar, and Sposi (2016)
use the methodology in Simonovska and Waugh (2014) to estimate θ separately for capital and non-capital
goods. They estimate θe = 0.23 and θm = 0.25. The results in this paper are not significantly altered if I
instead use θe = 0.23 and θm = 0.25.
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The parameters γe, γm, γs, and γc are, respectively, the share of value added in equip-
ment, intermediate goods, investment structures, and final good production. To calibrate γe
and γm, I use data on value-added and total output available in the INDSTAT 4 database
(UNIDO, 2013). I calculate the share of value-added in equipment and non-equipment man-
ufactured goods for all the available countries and average them across countries to arrive at
γe and γm, respectively. For γs, I compute the average share of valued-added in gross output
of construction for 32 OECD countries.10 Alvarez and Lucas (2007) discuss that the share
of value-added in final good production ranges in 0.7-0.8, depending on the source. I use
γc = 0.75, in accordance with their baseline value.
The labor force growth rate, n, of 0.016 is computed by using the average geometric
growth rate in the world population from 2000 through 2007. Following Alvarez and Lucas
(2007), I set η equal to 2. As is common in the literature, the discount rate is set at 0.96.
The inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, σ, is 1.5, as in Restuccia and Urrutia (2001).
β, σ and η are quantitatively not important for the issues addressed in this paper. Note that
these parameter values satisfy the following assumptions: 1
β
> 1 + n and 1 + θ(1− η) > 0.
Trade costs: To calibrate trade costs for equipment and intermediate goods, I use the
methodology employed in Mutreja, Ravikumar, and Sposi (2016). The model implies the
following structural relationships between trade costs, trade shares, and prices in each trad-
able sector:
pieij
piejj
=
(
Pej
Pei
)− 1
θ
τ
− 1
θ
eij
pimij
pimjj
=
(
Pmj
Pmi
)− 1
θ
τ
− 1
θ
mij , (5)
where piejj and pimjj are the home expenditure shares. I use data on bilateral trade shares,
home expenditure shares, and aggregate prices across countries along with equations in (5)
to pin down bilateral trade costs (see appendix B for how I construct the trade shares in
data).
There are many zeroes in the data. Of the 4160 possible bilateral country pairs, the
volume of trade for 584 pairs in equipment and 263 pairs in intermediate goods is zero. To
the country pairs where no trade exists I assign a high enough trade cost such that trade
is effectively eliminated. Equipped with all the calibrated parameters, when I compute the
10Value added and gross output data for OECD countries are from STAN database available at
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx.
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model equilibrium, the implied trade shares are extremely small for country pairs that have
zeros in the trade data matrix. For instance, in data there are zero equipment exports
from Argentina to Fiji. The calibrated model implies a trade share of 7.2 × 10−10, which is
negligible.
Similar to Waugh (2010), the calibrated trade costs are systematically higher for poor
exporters. The correlation between average equipment trade cost and income per worker
is -0.37, and that for intermediate goods is -0.44. The average equipment trade barrier
for the poor exporter (10th percentile country) is 11.86 times the the average trade barrier
faced by the rich exporter. For instance, fixing the US as the importer, the correlation
between equipment trade cost and income per worker is -0.18. If the importer is fixed at
China, then this correlation is -0.27. These correlations are more negative in the case of the
intermediate goods. The trade costs in Waugh (2010) are estimated from a gravity equation
with an exporter fixed effect. I do not assume either τe or τm to be exporter-specific. When
calibrated to the data on prices and trade flows, they turn out to be higher for poor exporters.
Both sets of trade costs are consistent with trade flows.
Productivity parameters: To calibrate the country-specific productivity parameters, I
employ structural relationships from the model that connect productivity parameters to
home expenditure shares and relative prices:11
Pei
Pmi
=Wm
(
λei
pieii
)−θ (
λmi
pimii
) θγe
γm
Pei
Pci
=We Aci
(
λei
pieii
)−θ (
λmi
pimii
) θ(γe−γc)
γm
Psi
Pci
=WsAci
(
λmi
pimii
) θ(γs−γc)
γm
, (6)
where Wm = UVe(UVm)
−
γe
γm is a constant (the derivations are in appendix A). I use data on
the price of equipment relative to intermediate goods, Pei
Pmi
, the relative price of equipment,
Pei
Pci
, the relative price of structures, Psi
Pci
, and the home expenditure shares in equipment and
intermediate goods to calibrate productivity parameters relative to US productivity levels.
Cross-country differences in the calibrated productivity levels are higher for equipment
than for intermediate goods (see table C.1, appendix C). The income elasticity of λθe is 0.50,
and the income elasticity of λθm is 0.21. Recall that λ
θ
ei is country i’s average equipment
11Mutreja, Ravikumar, and Sposi (2016) calibrate productivity parameters to relative prices and incomes
in their sample. I do not use data on income per worker for the calibration.
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productivity. The 90-10th percentile ratio of λθe is 3.54 and that of λ
θ
m is 0.87. Thus, rich
countries have an absolute and comparative advantage in equipment, and poor countries have
a comparative advantage in intermediate goods. Figure 2 plots
(
λei
λmi
)θ
against income per
worker across countries. The comparative advantage in equipment systematically increases
with incomes.
Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2012) measure sectoral TFP for 86 countries in 1996. They
estimate the 90th-10th percentile ratio of equipment TFP to be 8.7. In my model, the
analogue of this equipment TFP is the effective equipment productivity,
(
λei
pieii
)θ
. The 90th
to 10th percentile ratio of effective equipment productivity from the quantitative model is
4.43. Thus, the equipment productivity differences that are consistent with cross-country
prices and trade flows, and, as I show later, equipment production, capital stocks, and capital
composition, are smaller than the ones estimated by Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2012).
Figure 2: Comparative advantage in equipment,
λθei
λθmi
−0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
ARG
AUS
AUT
BEL
BOL
BRA
CAN
CHL
CHN
MAC
COL
CYP
DNK
ECU
FJI
FIN
FRA
GRC
HUN
ISL
IND
IDN
IRN
IRL
ISR
ITA
JPN
JOR
KEN
LUXMWI
MYS
MLT
MUS
MEX
MNG
NLD
NZL
NOR
PAN
PRY
PER
PHL
POL PRT QAT
KOR
ROM
SEN
ZAF ESP
SWE
THA
TON TTO
TUR
GBR
TZA
USA
URY
PRT
NER
EGY
KWT
TUN
Income per worker (US=1)
Co
mp
ara
tiv
e a
dv
an
tag
e i
n e
qu
ipm
en
t
Model fit: Calibration targets are the ratios of absolute prices of equipment and interme-
diate goods,
Pej
Pei
and
Pmj
Pmi
; the ratios of bilateral trade shares to exporter’s home expenditure
share in each bilateral country pair,
pieij
piejj
; relative prices, Pei
Pmi
, Pei
Pci
, and Psi
Pci
; and home expen-
diture shares in both tradable goods, pieii and pimii.
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Equipped with productivity parameters and trade costs, I compute the equilibrium. The
equilibrium implied allocations and prices fit calibration targets well. The income elasticity of
price of equipment is 0.03 in the data and 0.03 in the model. The corresponding elasticities
are 0.24 and 0.25 for intermediate goods. The income elasticity of the relative price of
equipment is -0.48 in the data and -0.55 in the model, while those for the relative price of
structures are -0.01 and -0.04, respectively. Finally, the income elasticity for the price of
equipment relative to intermediate goods is -0.21 in the data and -0.23 in the model. The
model also matches trade data reasonably well. The model and data correlation are 0.66 for
pieij
piejj
and 0.64 for
pimij
pimjj
. The correlations between home expenditure shares in the model and
the data are 0.96 for equipment and 0.89 for intermediate goods.
The model is also consistent with prices that are not specifically targeted in the calibra-
tion. The income elasticity for the price of structures is 0.49 in the data and 0.54 in the
model. The elasticities for the price of final good are 0.50 and 0.58 respectively. Thus, the
quantitative model is consistent with the data on prices and trade flows.
The calibrated productivity levels deliver the observed pattern of equipment production.
In the data, top seven countries produce 78.3 percent of the world equipment. This share is
75.5 percent in the model. The share of equipment produced in the bottom seven countries
is 0.004 percent in the data and 0.008 percent in the model. Figure D.1 in appendix D plots
the cumulative distribution of equipment production for the data and the model.
A remark is in order here. One might argue that relative to the existing literature, the
model puts significantly more structure on the data. The model incorporates bilateral trade
in both equipment equipment and intermediate goods. An alternative theoretical setup
is a model of bilateral trade that does not differentiate between trade in equipment and
non-equipment goods, as in Waugh (2010). Such a model, though consistent with bilateral
trade flows, would fail to produce the pattern of equipment production across countries.
Another alternative framework is a model that considers only bilateral trade in equipment,
as in Eaton and Kortum (2001). Such a framework would be able to explain equipment
production across countries but would be inconsistent with the overall trade flows.
5 Results
In this section, I first present the model-implied equipment capital shares, equipment and
structures capital stocks, and incomes. Thereafter, I use the structural framework to examine
the role of equipment trade in determining capital composition across countries.
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Equipment share in capital: Figure 3 plots the equipment capital share from the model
against those in the data, and table 2 presents summary statistics on cross-country differences
in the equipment capital share. The model slightly over explains the equipment share in
capital and reproduces 110 percent of the observed log variance. The model is also consistent
with the observed equipment capital share in rich and poor. The share of equipment in the
90th percentile country is 21 percent in the data. The model implies a share of 34 percent.
The share of equipment in the 10th percentile country is 7 percent in the data and 8.4 percent
in the model.
Table 2: Equipment share in capital
Data Model
Log variance 0.20 0.22
90-10 ratio 3.02 4.08
Figure 3: Equipment share in capital
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Equipment and structures capital stocks: The quantitative model matches cross-
country differences in equipment and structures capital. Figure 4 presents the world distri-
bution of equipment and structures capital in the model and data. The correlation between
23
Figure 4: Cross-country distribution of capital
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the model and data distribution for both kinds of capital is 0.99. Thus, the model reproduces
the world distribution of capital almost perfectly.
The quantitative model also predicts capital-output ratios and capital per worker that
are consistent with the data. Figure D.2 in appendix D plots the capital-output ratios
from the model against the ones in data. The equipment capital-output ratio is a factor of
5.88 between rich and poor in the data and 5.69 in the model. The model also reproduces
variation in structures capital across countries. The 90th-10th percentile ratio of structures
capital-output ratio is 1.66 in the data and 1 in the model. Figure D.3 in appendix D
presents equipment and structures capital per worker from the model and data. The 90th-
10th percentile ratio of equipment capital per worker is 54.06 in the data and 58.57 in the
model. The corresponding ratio for structures capital per worker is 15.22 in the data and
10.31 in the model.
Income per worker: The calibrated model is also consistent with observed income per
worker differences. Recall that the calibration exercise does not employ data on incomes to
calibrate any of the country-specific parameters. In the model, the income per worker in rich
is 9.2 times the income per worker in poor. The corresponding ratio in the data is 10.29.
World income distribution from data and model is plotted in figure D.4 in appendix D; the
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correlation between model and data is 0.99. The log variance of income per worker is 1.31
in the model and 0.96 in the data.
Implications: In the model, equipment capital share in a country is function of its produc-
tivity levels and trade flows. This relationship enables me to evaluate the role of equipment
trade in determining cross-country capital composition. The differences in equipment capi-
tal share are entirely due cross-country variation in
(
λmi
pimii
) θ(γe−γs)
γm
(
λei
pieii
)−θ
(see equation (3)).
The log variance of this term is 1.09. Following the variance decomposition methodology
commonly employed in the income differences literature, I decompose this log variance into
the log variance of the four components: λmi
θ(γe−γs)
γm , pimii
−θ(γe−γs)
γm , λei
−θ, and pieii
θ.12 The sum
of log variances of the four components is 0.59. The remaining log variance of 0.5 is split
equally amongst the four components. Of the log variance of 1.09, variation in equipment
productivity accounts for 52.6 percent. The equipment home expenditure share accounts
for 22.7 percent. In no way, this is small. The remaining 24.7 percent is accounted for by
intermediate goods productivity and home expenditure shares.
Figure 5: Equipment capital share and effective equipment productivity,
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Another way to interpret this variance decomposition is through the effective equipment
12This assumes that the four components are not complementary to each other.
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productivity,
(
λei
pieii
)θ
. The effective productivity in equipment accounts for over three fourths
of the variation in equipment share across countries. Figure 5 plots equipment capital share
against effective equipment productivity. Higher equipment productivity levels are associ-
ated with larger shares of equipment in capital. In other words, rich countries have higher
equipment capital shares because they are more productive in equipment, and trade en-
ables them to specialize in equipment production that results in higher effective equipment
productivity.
To summarize, the quantitative model implies that rich have an absolute and comparative
advantage in equipment, while poor have a comparative advantage in intermediate goods.
The model successfully explains cross-country dispersion in capital composition, stocks of
equipment and structures capital, and incomes. Rich countries have higher productivity in
equipment and, thus, larger shares of equipment in capital. A variance decomposition of
the model-implied equipment capital share suggests that the role of trade in accounting for
capital composition is non-trivial. The variance decomposition exercise abstracts from com-
plex interactions between capital composition, productivity levels and trade. I explore these
interactions and consequent implications for incomes in the next section via counterfactual
experiments.
6 Gains from Trade and Capital Composition
This section presents the counterfactual experiments, in which I adjust equipment trade
costs from their baseline levels and study the resulting implications for capital composition
and incomes.
Equipment trade costs affect the prices faced by poor countries versus rich countries and,
thus, govern the equipment-structures investment tradeoff. Theoretically, a country i with
λei
λmi
>
λej
λmj
for some j will tend to be a net exporter of equipment. The volume of equipment
exports, however, depends on the trade cost i faces when exporting equipment to all such
countries j. Therefore, trade costs influence the price at which i can supply equipment to
j, and thus i’s competitiveness in the world equipment market. Qualitatively, a reduction
in equipment trade costs is similar to an increase in equipment productivity, since, given
the factor resources, both increase the quantity of equipment goods in the world. This
increases overall world equipment investment and thus, equipment capital and equipment
capital share in the world. The distribution of this world equipment capital gain across
countries determines the implications for capital composition and incomes. Do all countries
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gain? If so, what is the relative distribution of these gains between poor and rich?
Table 3: Increase in share of equipment relative to baseline (percent)
Rich Poor Overall
avg.
τeij = τ
1985
eij -10.3 -2.7 -4.7
τeij =∞ -17.8 -3.9 -6.9
τeij = 1 14.7 10.9 14.7
Table 4: Income gain/loss and contribution of trade via capital composition (percent)
Change in income Fraction due to capital
per worker composition channel
Rich Poor Overall avg. Rich Poor Overall avg.
τeij = τ
1985
eij -12.5 -10.2 -8.4 35.1 64.2 45.1
τeij =∞ -20.3 -14.6 -12.3 46.9 70.9 49.1
τeij = 1 17.6 62.6 49.2 16.8 23.2 20.1
Note: Rich and poor correspond to 90th and 10th percentiles of the world
income per worker distribution, respectively.
The first counterfactual experiment focusses on the fall in equipment trade costs between
1985 and 2005. For this experiment, I calibrate the equipment trade costs for 1985 and
measure the fall in equipment trade cost for each bilateral country pair. The second and
third experiment explore extreme cases of autarky and zero gravity in equipment trade. In
each experiment, I present the rich versus poor distribution of the changes in equipment
capital share resulting from the changes in equipment trade costs relative to the baseline.
I also discuss the income gains/losses that accrue to countries via the capital composition
channel. Recall that income per worker is a function of TFP, capital per worker, and the
capital composition term (see equation (4)). As trade costs change, so does a country’s
capital composition term due to the change in its equipment capital share. This leads to
changes in income per worker. To quantify the importance of capital composition channel, I
use the percentage of quantitative income gains/losses that are due to changes in the capital
composition term. The results from counterfactual experiments are summarized in tables 3
and 4.13
13I conduct additional counterfactual experiments that are in the online appendix to this paper.
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6.1 From 1985 to 2005
The concurrent rise in world equipment capital intensity and world equipment trade volumes
has been facilitated, in part, by the declining trade costs. What role has the decline in
equipment trade costs played in the evolution of equipment capital shares and incomes
across countries? Is capital composition an important channel through income gains from
declining equipment trade costs have been transmitted?
To answer these questions, I measure the fall in equipment trade costs that occurred
between 1985 and 2005. I employ the methodology described in section 4 (see equation 5)
along with the data for 1985 on equipment prices and equipment trade shares. Construction
of trade shares requires data on production and bilateral trade volumes. These along with
the data on equipment prices are available for a sample of 32 countries only.14 Using the
calibrated bilateral equipment trade costs for 32 countries in 1985, I calculate the average
equipment trade cost for each exporter in 1985.15 Subtracting these from the corresponding
values in 2005, I arrive at the 1985-2005 fall in average equipment trade cost for each of the
32 exporters. Based on a regression of the 1985-2005 fall in average equipment export cost
on income per worker for 32 exporters, I impute the average fall in equipment trade cost
for all 65 exporters countries in the 2005 sample. Using the imputed 1985-2005 fall in trade
costs as a mark-up, I arrive at the bilateral equipment trade costs in 1985 for the 65 country
sample:
τ̂ 1985eij = (1 + ρ̂ej) τeij
where τ̂ 1985eij is the imputed equipment trade cost for 1985, ρ̂ej is the fall in average equipment
trade cost for exporter j, and τeij is the baseline calibrated value of equipment trade cost
in 2005. Thus, country j’s fall in average equipment trade cost, ρ̂ej, is applied uniformly to
equipment trade cost for all the bilateral pairings where j is an exporter.
An examination of the measured trade costs (for 65 countries) reveals that the decline
in equipment trade costs is slightly higher for rich exporters. During 1985-2005, equipment
trade costs fall by 74 percent in rich countries and by 68.6 percent in poor countries, on
average. As a result, relative to rich, poor exporters face slightly higher costs to export
equipment in 2005. In 1985, the average equipment export cost for poor is 11.6 times the
export cost in rich. In 2005, the corresponding ratio is only marginally higher at 11.86.
Thus, while equipment trade costs have declined in all countries, their systematic variation
14See appendix B for the data sources and procedures as well as the list of 32 countries in the 1985 sample.
15The baseline calibrated equipment trade costs are exporter-specific, not importer-specific. This is why,
a per-exporter average is computed here.
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with an exporter’s income level is essentially unchanged.
Figure 6: Declining equipment trade costs: 1985 to 2005
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In the counterfactual experiment, I set bilateral equipment trade barriers at their 1985
levels, τeij = τ̂
1985
eij . Other parameters, viz., common parameters, equipment productivity, λ
θ
ei,
intermediate goods productivity and trade costs, τmin and λ
θ
mi, and final good productivity,
Aci, are set at their calibrated baseline levels. With this set of parameters, I re-compute
the world general equilibrium. Note that this counterfactual simulates a situation where the
only difference between 1985 and 2005 is in the equipment trade costs. Comparing between
the counterfactual world and the baseline reveals the contribution of declining equipment
trade costs to the evolution of capital composition and incomes across countries.
As equipment trade barriers fall between 1985 and 2005, rich specialize more in their com-
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parative advantage good and focus resources away from the relatively inefficient intermediate
goods sector. More equipment is produced at home and, so, investment in equipment capital
increases. As a result, the equipment capital share in the rich increases by 10.3 percent
from 24 percent in the counterfactual world to 34.3 percent in the baseline. Poor countries
also gain. With the fall in barriers to import equipment, equipment becomes relatively less
expensive and so, investment in equipment rises. The equipment capital share would have
been lower at 5.7 percent in poor if the decline in equipment trade barriers had not taken
place, compared to 8.4 percent in the baseline. Figure 6 plots the gain in equipment capital
share associated with the 1985-2005 equipment trade cost decline. Cross-country differences
in equipment capital share also reduced with the 1985-2005 decline in equipment trade cost:
the log variance of equipment capital share is 0.29 compared to 0.22 in the baseline.
The 1985-2005 fall in equipment trade costs results in higher incomes in all countries.
Overall, income per worker gain is 12.5 percent in the rich and 10 percent in the poor. A
large fraction of these income gains stem from the changes in the capital composition term.
The capital composition term alone accounts for 35 percent of the income gain in rich and
64 percent in poor. Figure 6 plots the contribution of the composition term to incomes gains
(in percentage terms) against income per worker. Thus, between 1985 and 2005, capital
composition is an important channel through which equipment trade affects income across
countries.
6.2 Autarky and Zero Gravity in Equipment
Autarky in equipment: In the autarky experiment, I shut down equipment trade by
setting equipment trade barriers, τeij, at prohibitively high levels. I set the remaining pa-
rameters at their calibrated levels and re-compute the world equilibrium. That is, countries
still trade intermediate goods, albeit restricted by the calibrated levels of intermediate goods
trade costs. With this set of parameters, I re-compute the world general equilibrium.
In the absence of equipment trade, rich can no longer specialize in their comparative
advantage good and have to divert resources to their relatively inefficient intermediate goods
sector. Less equipment is produced at home and, so, investment in equipment capital de-
clines. As a result, the equipment capital share in the rich falls to 16.5 percent from 34
percent in the baseline.
Poor countries are also adversely affected. With equipment autarky, they can no longer
access the equipment produced in rich countries and the composition of their capital is
determined by domestic equipment productivity levels only. The equipment capital share
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declines to 4.5 percent from 8.4 percent in the baseline. Thus, equipment share in capital
reduces to about one-half in both rich and poor. Figure 7 plots the decline in equipment
share because of autarky in equipment. Cross-country differences in equipment capital share
also increase as the log variance of equipment share nearly doubles to 0.39.
Figure 7: Autarky in equipment
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The changes in equipment capital share across countries have implications for incomes.
Autarky is costly for all countries. Income per worker decreases by 20 percent in the rich
and 15 percent in the poor. A bulk of these losses are because of the capital composition
channel. It accounts for 47 percent of the income loss in the rich and 71 percent in the
poor. The contribution of the capital composition term to income change for all countries is
presented in figure 7.
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Zero gravity in equipment: In this experiment, I eliminate restrictions to equipment
trade by setting τeij=1 for all i and j, keep other parameters at their baseline calibrated
levels, and re-compute the world general equilibrium. This experiment simulates frictionless
equipment trade between countries. Equivalently, since piii = 1, in this counterfactual world
equipment goods flow across borders as they flow within a country. That is, if there are
restrictions to goods flow within countries, similar restrictions apply to cross-border equip-
ment trade as well. Intermediate goods trade is restricted by the calibrated levels of trade
costs.
Figure 8: Zero gravity in equipment, τeij = 1
−0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8
0
10
20
30
40
ARG
AUS
AUTBEL
BOL
BRA
CAN
CHL
CHN
MAC
COL
CYP
DNK
ECU
FJI
FIN
FRA
GRC
HUN
ISL
INDIDN
IRN IRL
ISR ITA
JPN
JORKEN
LUX
MWI
MYS
MLTMUS
MEXMNG
NLD
NZL NOR
PAN
PRY
P R
PHL
POL
PRT QAT
KOR
ROMSEN ZAF ESPSWE
THA
TON
TTOTUR GBR
TZA
USA
URYNER
EGY
KWT
TUN
Change in equipment capital share (percent)
Income per worker (US)=1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
ARG
AUSAUTBEL
BOL
BRA
CANCHL
CHN
MAC
COL
CYP DNK
ECU
FJI
FIN
FRAGRC
HUN
ISL
IND
IDN
IRN
IRL
ISR
ITA
JPN
JOR
KEN
LUXMWI
MYS
MLTMUS
MEX
MNG NLD
NZL
NOR
PAN
PRYPER
PHL
POL PRT
QAT
KORROM
SEN ZAF ESP
SWE
THA
TON
TTO
TUR
GBR
TZA USA
URY
PRT
NER
EGY
KWT
TUN
Income gain due to capital composition (percent)
Income per worker: US=1
With zero gravity, equipment goods are not lost in transit, and the quantity of world
equipment goods increases. This leads to overall higher equipment investment levels and
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larger equipment capital stock, compared to the baseline. All countries experience an increase
in their equipment capital share, and rich gain more than do poor. The share of equipment
increases to 49 percent in the rich from 34 percent in the baseline, and the poor’s equipment
capital share increases from 8.4 percent to 19.3 percent. Figure 8 plots the increase in the
equipment capital share. The correlation between the increase in share of equipment and
income per worker is 0.43. Cross-country differences in the equipment capital share also
decline. The log variance of the share of equipment reduces by 40 percent to 0.12.
With more equipment capital, income rises in all countries. Overall, income per worker
increases by 18 percent in the rich and by 63 percent in the poor. Capital composition is an
important channel through which equipment trade determines incomes. The change in the
capital composition term accounts for 17 percent of income gain in the rich and 23 percent in
the poor. The contribution of the capital composition channel for all countries is presented
in figure 8. The correlation in this figure is -0.22. Thus, changes in capital composition have
a larger impact on incomes in poor countries.
6.3 Discussion
Clearly, equipment trade is quantitatively important for the composition of capital. Rich
benefit by producing more of their comparative advantage good and poor benefit by ex-
changing intermediate goods for equipment that is inefficiently produced at home. Over the
years, declining costs to equipment trade have fueled the rise of equipment capital intensity
in the world. If equipment trade costs had remained at their level in 1985, the average world
equipment capital share would’ve been smaller by 4.7 percent. This is about one-fourth of
the average equipment capital share in 2005.
Income per worker is highly responsive to adjustments in equipment trade costs. With
the decline in equipment trade barriers, incomes rise by 8.5 percent, on average. Countries
gain income either because of changes in TFP, increase in the level of capital stock or because
of changes in the composition of their capital. A bulk of the income gains are channelled
through changes in capital composition, especially for poor countries. The proportion of
income changes stemming from changes in capital composition is 33 percent in rich and 73
percent in poor, on average. Thus, the capital composition channel is quantitatively more
important for poor countries (see also, the bottom panel of figures 6, 7, and 8).
The decline in equipment trade costs also has implications for TFP levels (see equation
4). The intermediate goods export barriers faced by poor countries have a bearing on the
volume of their exports and, through balanced trade, on the volume of their equipment
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imports. Reductions in equipment trade costs facilitate equipment investment in poor by
reducing the price of equipment and easing the pressure on intermediate goods exports to
finance equipment imports. With the 1985-2005 decline in τeij, poor no longer need to export
as much to finance their equipment imports. Rich countries, on the other hand, increase their
equipment exports and, through balanced trade, intermediate goods imports. As a result,
intermediate goods home expenditure shares, pimii, reduce in rich and increase in poor. This
affects their TFP levels,
(
λmi
pimii
) θ(1−γc)
γm
: TFP increases in rich countries and declines in poor
countries.
The roots of income gains from equipment trade lie in what happens to effective equip-
ment productivity,
(
λei
pieii
)θ
, as the trade costs are adjusted. Equipment trade affects the
composition of capital, and therefore, income through a country’s equipment home expen-
diture share. Rich countries have higher average equipment productivity, λi
θ, than poor
countries. The size of a country’s equipment sector is determined by its relative sectoral
productivity levels. Accordingly, rich have a larger equipment sector than poor even when
there is autarky in equipment. With trade, rich countries specialize in the production of
equipment goods for which they have the highest idiosyncratic productivity draws, resulting
in higher effective equipment productivity levels. The fall in equipment trade costs from
1985 to 2005 increases the relative size of the equipment sector, leading to lower equipment
home expenditure shares and higher effective equipment productivity. This translates into
larger equipment capital stocks and higher equipment capital shares in rich countries.
Poor countries, on the other hand, have less equipment in their capital stock because they
are inefficient at producing equipment. In autarky, factor mobility across sectors ensures a
relatively small equipment sector and, so, little equipment is produced at home. This leads to
smaller equipment capital stock and lower equipment capital shares in autarky. The decline
in equipment trade barriers from 1985 to 2005 reallocates resources to the production of
intermediate goods that are exported to finance imported equipment. This reduces the size
of the equipment sector in poor countries and their equipment home expenditure shares
decline. As a result, their effective equipment productivity, equipment capital stocks, and
so, equipment capital shares increase.
Figure 9 plots the 1985-2005 increases in equipment capital share along with the gains in
effective equipment productivity. The baseline level of US effective equipment productivity is
normalized to unity. The correlation in this figure is 0.72. That is, countries that experience
larger gains in their effective equipment productivity are the ones that also witness bigger
increases in their equipment capital share. From 1985 to 2005, the effective equipment
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Figure 9: Equipment capital share and effective equipment productivity: 1985-2005
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Note: US effective equipment productivity in baseline is normalized to one.
productivity increases by a factor of 1.7 in rich and by a factor of 1.5 in poor. The rich-poor
gap in effective equipment productivity increases marginally. The analogous figures under
autarky and zero gravity in equipment, figures D.5 and D.6, are in appendix D.
Overall, a reduction in equipment trade costs reallocates world resources towards more
efficient outcomes and increases effective equipment productivity in all countries. The gains
in effective productivity have significant implications for incomes: (i) the income gains are
large for all countries, and (ii) capital composition is an important channel through which
reduced equipment trade costs result in higher incomes for all countries.
Economic growth is accompanied by an equipment intensification of physical capital.
Trade speeds up this process. Textbooks on economic growth and development characterize
the process of economic growth by rapid capital accumulation. One key feature of rapid
capital accumulation has been the rise of equipment capital intensity. Countries that gain
the most from equipment trade do so not only because they accumulate more capital but also
because they accumulate equipment capital at a faster rate than structures. All countries
gain from reductions in equipment trade costs; poor countries gain more through the capital
composition channel.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, I first examine the role of equipment trade in determining capital composition
across countries. Although productivity levels are quantitatively the most important, I also
unearth a non-trivial role for trade. I have argued that rich countries have a higher share of
equipment in capital because they are more productive in equipment, and through equipment
trade they reap efficiency gains that accompany specialization in the goods of comparative
advantage. Poor countries, on the other hand, have a lower share of equipment because
they are inefficient at producing equipment and face large costs to export their comparative
advantage good in exchange for imported equipment. I also unearth a new quantitatively
important channel through which trade affects incomes: composition of capital. Reductions
in equipment trade costs alter capital composition across countries and result in income gains
for all.
While my model explains capital composition and measures the impact of trade on capi-
tal composition and incomes reasonably, obviously I have not told the whole story. As noted
previously, capital composition is affected by the abundance of complementary factors, a
channel that is absent in my framework. Also, my framework abstracts from investment-
specific technological change and cross-country differences in the quality of equipment and
structures capital. Much remains to be said about implications of these for capital compo-
sition, and the role of trade in these mechanisms.
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Appendix
A Derivations
Price indices and trade shares: In this section, I derive the expressions for the price
index and trade share of equipment. The expressions for the price index and trade share of
intermediate goods can be derived in a similar manner. The derivations below follow the
ones in Alvarez and Lucas (2007).
To derive an expression for the aggregate equipment price index, I use following properties
of an exponential distribution:
1) u ∼ exp(ψ) and κ > 0⇒ κu ∼ exp(ψ/κ).
2) u1 ∼ exp(ψ1) and u2 ∼ exp(ψ2)⇒ min{u1, u2} ∼ exp(ψ1 + ψ2).
The producers in the equipment sector minimize their costs of production. This implies
the following price for each equipment good e ∈ [0, 1] that has idiosyncratic productivity of
zei in country i and is produced domestically:
peii(e) = Ve
(
rαµei r
α(1−µ)
si w
1−α
i
)γe
P 1−γemi z
θ
ei,
where Ve = (αγe)
−αγe((1− α)γe)
(α−1)γe(1− γe)
γe−1 is a collection of constant terms. Perfect
competition implies that price of good e in country i, when purchased from country j, is
given by:
peij(e) = Ve
(
rαµej r
α(1−µ)
sj w
1−α
j
)γe
P 1−γemj τeijz
θ
ej.
Country i purchases each individual equipment good from the least cost supplier. So, the
price of good e is
pei(e)
1/θ = (Ve)
1/θmin
j
[{(
rαµej r
α(1−µ)
sj w
1−α
j
)γe
P 1−γemj τeij
}1/θ
zθej
]
.
Since zej ∼ exp(λej), it follows from property 1 that{(
rαµej r
α(1−µ)
sj w
1−α
j
)γe
P 1−γemj τeij
}1/θ
zej ∼ exp
({(
rαµej r
α(1−µ)
sj w
1−α
j
)γe
P 1−γemj τeij
}−1/θ
λej
)
.
Then, property 2 implies that
min
j
[{(
rαµej r
α(1−µ)
sj w
1−α
j
)γe
P 1−γemj τeij
}1/θ
zej
]
∼ exp
(∑
j
{(
rαµej r
α(1−µ)
sj w
1−α
j
)γe
P 1−γemj τeij
}−1/θ
λej
)
.
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Another application of property 1 leads to:
pei(e)
1/θ ∼ exp(φei)
φei = (Ve)
−1/θ
∑
j
{(
rαµej r
α(1−µ)
sj w
1−α
j
)γe
P 1−γemj τeij
}−1/θ
λej (7)
This implies
P 1−ηei = φei
∫
pei
θ(1−η) exp (−φeipei) dpei.
Letting ωi = φeipei, the above expression modifies to:
P 1−ηei = (φei)
θ(η−1)
∫
ω
θ(1−η)
i exp(−ωi)dωi.
Let U = Γ(1 + θ(1− η))1/(1−η), where Γ(·) is the Gamma function. Therefore,
Pei = UVe
[∑
j
{(
rαµej r
α(1−µ)
sj w
1−α
j
)γe
P 1−γemj τeij
}−1/θ
λej
]−θ
(8)
To derive the trade share, pieij , note that pieij is the fraction of country i’s total spending on
equipment goods that are sourced from country j. Because of the distributional assumption
and the law of large numbers, this fraction is also the probability that j is a least cost supplier
of equipment to i:
pieij = Pr
{
peij(e) ≤ min
v
[peiv(e)]
}
=
{(
rαµej r
α(1−µ)
sj w
1−α
j
)γe
P 1−γemj τeij
}−1/θ
λej∑
v
{(
rαµev r
α(1−µ)
sv w1−αv
)γe
P 1−γemv τeiv
}−1/θ
λev
, (9)
where I use property 2 and the following property of exponential distribution: u1 ∼ exp(ψ1)
and u2 ∼ exp(ψ2)⇒ Pr(u1 ≤ u2) =
ψ1
ψ1+ψ2
.
Equilibrium relative prices: Here, I derive the equilibrium expression for relative prices
that are used in the calibration of the model: Pei/Pmi, Pei/Pci, and Psi/Pci. These derivations
follow the ones in Mutreja, Ravikumar, and Sposi (2016). In equilibrium, aggregate price
indices are given by:
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Pei = UVe
[∑
j
{(
rαµej r
α(1−µ)
sj w
1−α
j
)γe
P 1−γemj τeij
}−1/θ
λej
]−θ
Pmi = UVm
[∑
j
{(
rαµej r
α(1−µ)
sj w
1−α
j
)γm
P 1−γmmj τmij
}−1/θ
λmj
]−θ
Psi = Vs
(
rαµei r
α(1−µ)
si w
1−α
i
)γs
P 1−γsmi
Pci = Vc
1
Aci
(
rαµei r
α(1−µ)
si w
1−α
i
)γc
P 1−γcmi
Using equations (8) and (9):
pieii =
{(
rαµei r
α(1−µ)
si w
1−α
i
)γe
P 1−γemi
}−1/θ
λei
(UVe)1/θP
−1/θ
ei
⇒
Pei
Pmi
= UVe
(
rµeir
1−µ
si
wi
)αγe (
wi
Pmi
)γe ( λei
pieii
)−θ
(10)
Using aggregate price of structures and final good,
Pei
Pci
=
UVe
Vc
Aci
(
rµeir
1−µ
si
wi
)α(γe−γc)(
wi
Pmi
)γe−γc ( λei
pieii
)−θ
Psi
Pci
=
Vs
Vc
Aci
(
rµeir
1−µ
si
wi
)α(γs−γc)(
wi
Pmi
)γs−γc
(11)
Using trade share and price index of intermediate goods,
pimii =
{(
rαµei r
α(1−µ)
si w
1−α
i
)γm
P 1−γmmi
}−1/θ
λmi
(UVm)1/θP
−1/θ
mi
⇒
wi
Pmi
= (UVm)
− 1
γm
(
rµeir
1−µ
si
wi
)−α(
λmi
pimii
) θ
γm
Using this in expressions (10) and (11) leads to the equations in (6).
Composition of capital: The equilibrium capital-output ratios are a function of the
respective relative prices:
kei
yi
=
αµ
1
β
− (1− δe)
1
Pei/Pci
ksi
yi
=
α(1− µ)
1
β
− (1− δs)
1
Psi/Pci
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Using the expressions for relative prices derived above leads to the expression for capital-
output ratios and equipment capital share in (3).
Income per worker: The income per worker is defined as
yi =
wi
Pci
+
rei
Pci
+
rsi
Pci
Using the first order conditions from firm optimization,
yi =
1
1− α
wi
Pci
Using the expression for price of final good, derived above, along with first order conditions
from firm optimization leads to the following expression:
yi = (1− α)
(1−α)γcαµαµγcα(1− µ)α(1−µ)γcVc k
αµγc
ei k
α(1−µ)γc
si
(
wi
Pmi
)1−γc
Combining this with the following expression of intermediate goods home expenditure share
and firm optimization first order conditions,
pieii = UVm
(
rαµγmei r
α(1−µ)γm
si w
(1−α)γm
i P
1−γm
mi
)− 1
θ
λmi
P
− 1
θ
mi
results in the following expression for income per worker:
yi = ΛAci
(
λm
pimii
) θ(1−γc)
γm (
kµeik
1−µ
si
)α
where Λ = (1− α)−(1−α)αµ−αµα(1− µ)−α(1−µ) 1
Vc
UV θm
−
(1−γc)
γm is a collection of constants.
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B Data
The data set comprises prices, national accounts, production, trade, and capital stocks for
a cross-section of 65 countries in 2005. The list of countries is in table C.1. This sample
includes both rich and poor countries and accounts for 78 percent of world GDP in 2005.16
Goods categories: The goods categories here are consistent with the definitions in the
System of National Accounts 1993.17 Equipment corresponds to ISIC revision 2 cate-
gories 381-385, i.e., fabricated metal products, electrical and non-electrical machinery, trans-
port equipment, communication equipment, office machinery, and professional and scientific
equipment. ICP also identifies these as “machinery & equipment”.18 Structures include
residential and non-residential buildings.19
Prices: Data on the price of equipment and structures are from the International Compar-
ison Program.20 The price of equipment corresponds to the purchasing power parity (PPP)
price of “Machinery & equipment”, world price equal to 1. The price of structures is the PPP
price of “Construction”; world price equal to 1. For the price of final good, I use data on
variable ”PC” from the Penn World Tables version 6.3. The price of intermediate goods uses
prices from the benchmark ICP data. It is constructed by aggregating PPP prices across all
goods except durable goods and services.
The equipment and structures capital stocks employed in this paper are based on PPP
data from Penn World Tables version 6.3 (see Mutreja, 2014, for details). Thus, to maintain
consistency with the data on capital stocks, prices and other PPP data have been taken from
Penn World Tables version 6.3.
National Accounts: Income per worker is from Penn World Tables version 6.3 (Hes-
ton, Summers, and Aten, 2009) as the variable RGDPWOK. Using real GDP per capita
(RGDPL), real income per worker (RGDPWOK), and population (POP) from the Penn
World Table version 6.3 (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2009), I calculate RGDPL*POP
RGDPWOK
to ar-
rive at data on the labor force.
16World GDP is computed from the Penn World Tables version 6.3 (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2009)
17SNA 1993 is available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/sna1993.asp.
18The ICP documentation is available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ICPINT/Resources/270056-
1255977254560/6483625-1291755426408/7604122-1363984715044/15 Chapter 14.pdf.
19In SNA, residential buildings but not consumer durables are considered as as part of the production
boundary.
20ICP is available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ICPEXT/Resources/ICP 2011.html
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Production: Data on manufacturing production is from INDSTAT4 2013, a database
maintained by UNIDO (2013). This database is organized according to ISIC revision 3
classification.21 To extract equipment production data from this database, I identify the
categories in 4 digit ISIC revision 3 that correspond to categories 381-385 in ISIC revision 2.
The ISIC revision 3 categories are 2811, 2812, 2813, 2893, 2899, 291*, 292*, 30**, 31**, 321*,
322*, 323*, 331*, 332*, 3420, 351*, 352*, 353*, and 3599. Intermediate goods correspond to
manufactured goods other than equipment.
To have the largest country coverage possible, I supplement production data with infor-
mation from more aggregated INDSTAT2 2013, which is organized at 2-digit level. Most
countries are taken from the year 2005. In the case of missing data for 2005 in both IND-
STAT4 and INDSTAT2, if information is available for any of the years 2000-04 and 2006 in
INDSTAT4, I take data from the year closest to 2005 and convert into 2005 values by using
growth rates of total manufacturing output over the same period.
Trade Flows: Bilateral trade data for 2005 is from UN Comtrade (http://comtrade.un.org).
UN Comtrade data are organized according to SITC revision 2 level. In order to identify
SITC revision 2 categories for equipment goods, I employ the SITC revision 2 - ISIC revi-
sion 3 correspondence in Affendy, Sim Yee, and Satoru (2010). Trade in intermediate goods
corresponds to manufactured goods trade other than the trade equipment.
Trade Shares: Following Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003), I construct bilateral
trade shares as follows:
pieij =
Country i’s equipment imports from country j
Home equipment production + equipment imports from sample - equipment exports to world
Trade shares for the intermediate goods sector are constructed similarly.
Capital composition: The data on capital composition, and equipment and structures
capital stocks are from Mutreja (2014).
Countries in 1985 sample: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Greece, Hungary, India, Iran, (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lux-
embourg, Malawi, Mauritius, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Portugal,
Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Portugal and Egypt.
21Available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?cl=2
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C Tables
Table C.1: Productivity parameters
Country Isocode
λ
θ
eUS
λθ
ei
λ
θ
mUS
λθ
mi
AcUS
Aci
Argentina ARG 1.17 5.71 3.35
Australia AUS 1.17 1.22 1.13
Austria AUT 0.86 1.60 1.05
Belgium BEL 1.16 2.55 2.24
Bolivia BOL 2.41 9.05 1.94
Brazil BRA 1.30 2.48 1.32
Canada CAN 1.30 4.03 1.39
Chile CHL 1.62 2.92 1.51
China CHN 2.75 3.46 2.19
China (Macao SAR) MAC 1.67 2.14 2.39
Colombia COL 1.96 4.45 1.74
Cyprus CYP 1.99 2.95 1.68
Denmark DNK 0.97 1.64 1.10
Ecuador ECU 3.77 4.67 1.95
Fiji FJI 1.46 6.83 1.71
Finland FIN 1.43 1.07 1.20
France FRA 0.94 1.07 1.00
Greece GRC 1.64 1.79 1.36
Hungary HUN 0.96 2.69 1.12
Iceland ISL 1.96 1.54 1.71
India IND 1.88 3.02 1.66
Indonesia IDN 1.97 7.00 1.88
Iran (Islamic Republic of) IRN 2.57 3.59 1.98
Ireland IRL 0.95 1.79 1.14
Israel ISR 2.16 1.96 1.63
Italy ITA 1.68 1.19 1.28
Japan JPN 1.93 1.16 1.37
Jordan JOR 3.26 3.92 1.99
Kenya KEN 0.95 5.29 1.61
Luxembourg LUX 1.02 2.14 1.90
Malawi MWI 5.06 8.09 7.22
Malaysia MYS 3.99 6.38 2.37
Malta MLT 1.90 3.94 1.88
Mauritius MUS 0.84 4.40 1.74
Mexico MEX 0.98 4.18 1.08
Mongolia MNG 5.88 16.76 9.06
Netherlands NLD 0.63 2.07 1.27
New Zealand NZL 0.89 1.38 1.07
Norway NOR 1.33 1.02 1.34
Panama PAN 4.86 7.03 2.48
Paraguay PRY 1.22 7.45 1.64
Peru PER 3.36 4.14 1.78
Philippines PHL 2.30 7.95 2.13
Poland POL 1.52 2.34 1.31
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table C.1 – Continued
Country Isocode
λ
θ
eUS
λθ
ei
λ
θ
mUS
λθ
mi
AcUS
Aci
Portugal PRT 2.04 2.39 1.44
Qatar QAT 2.47 4.01 2.43
Republic of Korea KOR 2.94 1.64 1.84
Romania ROM 1.62 2.79 1.52
Senegal SEN 1.89 5.01 2.32
South Africa ZAF 0.92 1.44 1.21
Spain ESP 0.97 1.28 1.02
Sweden SWE 0.59 0.89 0.88
Thailand THA 3.69 5.55 2.24
Tonga TON 2.29 6.66 3.05
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 1.52 3.21 1.40
Turkey TUR 1.69 2.05 1.40
United Kingdom GBR 0.84 1.01 1.02
United Republic of Tanzania TZA 2.83 5.15 2.12
United States of America USA 1.00 1.00 1.00
Uruguay URY 1.45 3.71 1.52
Puerto Rico PRT 2.04 2.29 1.49
Niger NER 1.69 7.14 1.73
Egypt EGY 1.36 3.88 1.96
Kuwait KWT 5.07 2.07 2.20
Tunisia TUN 1.47 3.07 1.96
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D Figures
Figure D.1: Share in world equipment production
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Figure D.2: Capital-output ratios (model versus data)
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Figure D.3: Capital per worker (model versus data)
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Figure D.4: World income distribution
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Figure D.5: Equipment capital share and effective equipment productivity: autarky in
equipment
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Figure D.6: Equipment capital share and effective equipment productivity: zero gravity in
equipment
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